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Rational Information Leakage
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Abstract
Empirical evidence suggests that information leakage in capital markets is common.
We present a trading model to study the incentives of an informed trader (e.g., a well
informed insider) to voluntarily leak information about an assets value to one or more
independent traders. Our model shows that, while leaking information dissipates the
insiders information advantage about the assets value, it enhances his information
advantage about the assets execution price relative to other informed traders. The
prot impact of these two e¤ects are countervailing. When there are a su¢ cient number
of other informed traders, the prot impact from enhanced information dominates.
Hence, the insider has incentives to leak some of his private information. We label this
rational information leakage and discuss its implications for the regulation of insider
trading.
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1 Introduction
The role of information and information-based trading in capital markets has long been a
topic of interest to investors, nancial regulators, as well as academics. Information-based
trades are often credited with contributing to the e¢ ciency of capital markets but they
are alleged also to lead to wealth transfers among investors, particularly when such trades
are based on private (perhaps inside) information (e.g., Bhattacharya and Nicodano 2001,
Jeng, Metrick, and Zeckhauser 2003, De Franco, Lu, and Vasvari 2007). An important
channel through which private information a¤ects trades is through information leakage
where information is selectively revealed to a subset of investors. Evidence suggests that
information leakage is common. For example, evidence of abnormal changes in stock prices
and trading volumes shortly before analyst recommendations or major corporate events is
often attributed to leaked information (Irvine, Lipson, and Puckett 2007, Christophe, Ferri,
and Hsieh 2010). Similarly, Khan and Lu (2013) suggest that leaked information can explain
the increased short-sale trading of both market makers and non-market makers shortly before
the sale of shares by corporate executives.
If information leakage is an important channel through which private information a¤ects
stock prices and trading behavior, then it is important to understand why informed individu-
als would be motivated to leak their private information.1 The standard intuition holds that
some privately informed individuals, e.g., corporate executives and board members hindered
from actively trading in their rmsshares, share or sell their private information to related
parties and associates who then trade on the private information for their joint benet. For
instance, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), in its ongoing campaign
against insider trading, has noted the rise of so-called expert networkswhere insiders with
access to private information are hired and compensated as hedge fund consultants (Zuck-
erman and Pulliam 2010). Similarly, sell-side analysts who cannot otherwise trade on the
information they generate can indirectly prot from their work by pre-releasing (or tipping)
1Of course, private information can also be stolen by (or involuntarily leaked to) individuals intent on
exploiting private information. For example, in 2009, the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission (SEC)
charged a major brokerage rm for illegally allowing traders from other rms to listen to condential trading
information of its institutional customers without their knowledge using Squawk Boxes(SEC press release
#2009-54).
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their analyst recommendations to those clients who generate signicant commission revenues.
In this paper, we argue that informed tradersincentives to leak information extend be-
yond the above standard logic. In particular, we show that an informed investor (e.g., an
insider who is allowed to trade actively) may voluntarily reveal some of his private informa-
tion to unrelated or independent third parties and yet benet from this leakage even in the
absence of explicit payments, commissions, or claims to the other partys trading prots.
To illustrate an informed traders rationale to leak information as parsimoniously as pos-
sible, we consider a standard Kyle model (Kyle 1985) where a single well informed insider
trades a single security in a market populated with other less well informed traders as well
as liquidity traders. To characterize information leakage where information is selectively
revealed to a small subset of investors, we assume that the insider provides a garbled version
of his information to a single (una¢ liated) informed trader whom we label as a designated
trader.2 We assume that the insider can commit to a noisy information leakage system and
that the extent of noise in that leaked information is common knowledge. We nd that
leaking information to the designated trader (without receiving compensation in return)
has countervailing e¤ects on the insiders expected trading prots. The negative e¤ect is
straightforward; leaking information to another trader dissipates the insiders information
advantage concerning the fundamental value of the asset. This reduces the insiders trading
prot. The positive e¤ect is more subtle; leaking information increases the insiders infor-
mation advantage concerning the execution price of the asset relative to everyone else. This
is because trades that rely on the leaked information render the asset price sensitive to the
noise or non-fundamental component of the leaked information which is observable by the
insider. This e¤ect increases the insiders trading prot.
Clearly, when the prot impact of the negative e¤ect dominates the prot impact of the
positive e¤ect, the insider has no incentive to leak information. Conversely, when the positive
e¤ect dominates the negative e¤ect, information leakage is rational. Overall, information
leakage benets the insider, the single designated trader and liquidity traders at the expense
2We also consider a more general model in Section 4.1 where the insider reveals a garbled version of his
information to all other informed traders, not just one. Although revealing information to a large group of
traders is less descriptive of the notion of information leakage,the insiders motivation is similar nonetheless
to his motivation to leak information to a single designated trader.
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of other informed traders. The liquidity traders benet because information leakage reduces
the overall level of information asymmetry amongst market participants rendering the market
deeper for trade. In turn, the single designated trader benets mainly because he gains an
information advantage vis-à-vis other informed traders.3 Moreover, we nd that information
leakage is rational if and only if there are a su¢ cient number of other informed traders.
The intuition is straightforward. Because the insiders benet accrues only at the expense of
other informed traders, a su¢ ciently large population of other traders is required to render
information leakage protable.
Our nding that the insider benets at the expense of other informed traders who are not
privy to the leaked information is consistent with recent empirical evidence that institutional
investor trades (which are analogous to other informed traders in our model) are inversely
associated with insider trades (Sias and Whidbee 2010). Our nding also implies that other
informed traders collectively reduce their information collection e¤orts as the marginal ben-
et of doing so declines due to information leakage. Finally, our model demonstrates that
information leakage can enhance market depth and can dampen liquidity traders losses.
This latter result complements Lelands (1992) nding that more insider trading can benet
uninformed liquidity traders by making the market more liquid.
Our contribution can be summarized as follows: First, we characterize a novel channel of
information leakage and show that such leakage might indeed be rational. This is in sharp
contrast to the standard intuition that informed investors cannot benet from sharing infor-
mation without a commensurate fee or direct compensation. Second, our study provides a
possible explanation for empirical ndings that nd abnormal trading behavior immediately
prior to insider trades, analyst stock recommendations, or major corporate events. In this
spirit, we identify settings where information leakage can occur and highlight potential em-
pirical implications. For example, the insider is more likely to leak information when there
are more informed traders, and/or when other traders are relatively well informed.
Finally, our paper contributes to the debate on how to regulate insider trading. Sharing
3When the insider reveals some information to all other informed traders (as in Section 4.1), all will trade
optimally on the information even though no one enjoys an information advantage over another. In this
case, the insider and the liquidity traders benet at the expense of all other informed traders despite the
fact that the information that is revealed improves all informed tradersunderstanding of rm value.
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of information amongst a subset of investors, whether through leakage, tipping or other
broader forms of selective disclosure, has been a critical concern of capital market regulators
and has attracted signicant attention from academics over several decades (SEC 2000).
The wealth transfers from some traders to others highlighted in our model illustrate that
those who diligently collect and process information (e.g., informed traders who are not
privy to the leaked information) are not appropriately rewarded for their e¤orts. Thus,
understanding this rational mechanism for information sharing highlights the need to focus on
the underlying incentives rather than simply building a Chinese Wall such as the Regulation
Fair Disclosure.
Although prior theoretical studies have not considered the type of information leakage we
highlight in this paper, in a broad sense our model is related to the huge information selling
literature.4 For instance, our model has elements in common with both Fishman and Hagerty
(1995) and Cheynel and Levine (2012) but di¤ers from both technically as well as practically
in terms of the empirical contexts to which it applies. In Fishman and Hagerty (1995), the
insider also prots at the expense of other traders but the source of such prots is not due to
an information advantage that comes from strategic information leakage. Instead, the prots
derive from the sale of information to previously uninformed traders who compete against
other informed traders. In Cheynel and Levine (2012), the prots also derive from the sale
of information (as in Fishman and Hagerty) but the focus is on non-trading analysts selling
non-fundamental information (e.g., information about supply noise) to all potential traders.
Although such non-fundamental information gives some traders an information advantage
over the execution price of the asset (as in our model), the Cheynel and Levine model is
not designed to address an insiders strategic decision to leak fundamental information to a
single or select few other traders.5
Given that information leakage is a form of selective disclosure, our paper is also re-
lated to accounting studies examining the implication of public disclosures using strategic
4This literature was started by a series of studies conducted by Admati and Peiderer (1986, 1988, 1990)
and Allen (1990). Other notable work includes Benabou and Laroque (1992), Fishman and Hagerty (1995),
Veldkamp (2006), Cespa (2008), Garcia and Vanden (2009), Garcia and Sangiorgi (2011), and Cheynel and
Levine (2012), among many others.
5The general idea that noise or non-fundamental information is a source of information advantage is also
illustrated in van Bommel (2003) and Brunnermeier (2005), both of which use a dynamic model to show
that an informed trader can prot from the price overshooting caused by non-fundamental information.
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Kyle-type models (e.g., Bushman and Indjejikian 1995, Huddart, Hughes, and Levine 2001).
For instance, Bushman and indjejikian (1995) demonstrate that disclosing some public in-
formation to all market participants, including the market maker, can benet an insider by
driving out some informed traders who would otherwise stay in the market. In contrast,
the insider in our model leaks the information to a single designated trader or a select few
traders who benet from the information at the expense of all other traders in the market-
place. Moreover, in contrast to public disclosure, private leakage of information raises the
possibility that the insider is more strategic in the sense that he prefers to leak the infor-
mation to certain types of traders more than others. Specically, our analysis in Section 4.2
suggests that, among all informed traders, the insider prefers to leak the information to the
less informed.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model setup
and equilibrium. Section 3 shows the rationality of information leakage, outlining the con-
ditions that must prevail for the insider to leak private information. Section 4 shows the
robustness of our results to some alternative settings, and Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 Setup
Consider a Kyle-type model with a single risky-asset whose uncertain liquidating value is
represented by ~"  N (0; 1).6 There are two types of risk-neutral informed traders: (1) a
well-informed investor (e.g., insider) who privately observes ~"; and (2) two groups of informed
traders (N1 and N2) who observe private signals about ~" as follows:
~y1;j = ~"+ ~1;j where ~1;j  N
 
0; h 11

(with h1 > 0) for j = 1; : : : ; N1; (1)
and ~y2;j = ~"+ ~2;j where ~2;j  N
 
0; h 12

(with h2 > 0) for j = 1; : : : ; N2: (2)
Descriptively, the insider in our model can be thought of as a hedge fund manager or
6The normalization that ~" has a zero mean and a unit standard deviation is without loss of generality.
Instead, if we assume ~"  N ("; 1=e) (with " 2 R and e > 0), then all our results would hold as long as we
reinterpret the information precisions (h and z) as signal-to-noise ratios.
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corporate executive with superior information about a rms prospects, while the N1 + N2
informed traders in our model can be thought of as institutional investors that may actively
engage in information acquisition but nonetheless are less well informed than corporate
insiders.
Before trade occurs, we assume that the insider leaks a garbled version of his information
to all traders in one group (say group 1). That is, in addition to ~y1;j, traders in group 1
receive a signal of the form
~yL;j = ~"+ ~j, with ~j  N (0; 1=z) and z  0 for j = 1; : : : ; N1: (3)
We note that the precision z of ~j dictates the extent to which the insider leaks information
where z = 0 corresponds to no information leakage and z !1 corresponds to full leakage.
Clearly, ~j is in the insiders information set because he observes ~" and the leaked signals
~yL;j. Indeed, the insiders knowledge of ~j is central to our results because such knowledge
confers an informational advantage relative to all other market participants.
To illustrate the insiders rationale to leak information as parsimoniously as possible,
for the remainder of this section and throughout Section 3 we assume that N1 = 1 and
h1 = h2 = h. That is, we assume the insider leaks information to a single trader who is
otherwise equally well informed as the other N2 traders prior to observing the leaked signal.
For greater clarity, we denote the trader privy to the leaked information as trader D for
designated trader. Accordingly, we write trader Ds signal ~y1;j as ~yD, the leaked information
~yL;j = ~"+~j as ~yL = ~"+~, and other tradersprivate signals ~y2;j = ~"+~2;j as ~yj = ~"+~j. This
simplication notwithstanding, in Appendix A1, we consider a more general model where
N1 6= 1. In addition, in Section 4 we address the insiders motivation to leak information to
multiple traders as well as his motivations in the event that h1 6= h2.
The market is also populated by risk-neutral liquidity traders whose net order is repre-
sented by
~u  N  0; 2u , with u > 0 (4)
and a risk-neutral market maker who only observes the aggregate market order ow and sets
the price. Finally, we assume that all the underlying random variables f~"; ~; ~u; ~D; ~1; :::; ~N2g
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are mutually independent and the statistical properties of all random variables are common
knowledge.
2.2 Equilibrium
As in Kyle (1985) and the subsequent literature, we restrict attention to equilibria in which
the price is linear in order ow and each traders strategy is linear in the statistics charac-
terizing that traders information. Specically, the market maker sets the price according to
the weak e¢ ciency rule:
~p = E (~"j~!) = ~!, (5)
where ~! is the aggregate market order ow
~! = ~xI + ~xD +
N2P
j=1
~xj + ~u, (6)
with ~xI , ~xD and ~xj representing the orders submitted by the insider, the designated trader
and the j-th other informed traders, respectively.
Any trader i (insider, designated trader or other informed) taking the strategies of others
and the price function as given solves
max
~xi
E [ (~"  ~p) ~xij Ii] ,
where Ii is his information set.
The rst-order condition is
E

@ (~"  ~p)
@~xi
~xi + (~"  ~p)
 Ii = 0, (7)
which, by ~p = ~! = 

~xI + ~xD +
PN2
j=1 ~xj + ~u

, implies that the optimal order ow is
~xi =
1
2
h
E (~"j Ii)  
P
k 6=iE ( ~x

kj Ii)
i
. (8)
In addition, the rst-order condition implies that E (~"  ~pj Ii) = ~xi and thus the optimal
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expected prot is
i = E fE [ (~"  ~p) ~xi j Ii]g = V ar (~xi ) . (9)
Given the information structure, the optimal trading strategies of the insider, the desig-
nated trader or the j-th other informed trader take the following linear structure:26664
~xI = I~"+ L~yL
~xD = DE (~"j~yD; ~yL) + L~yL
~xj = E (~"j~yj)
37775 , (10)
where coe¢ cients I , L, D, L and  are endogenously determined. The coe¢ cients I and
D respectively represent the trading aggressiveness of the insider and the designated trader
when they make decisions based on their predictions regarding ~" with their own information.
The coe¢ cients L and L capture the strategic interaction between the insider and the
designated trader.
As standard in the literature, using the rst-order condition (Equation (8)) and the
conjectured linear trading strategy structure (Equation (10)), we can form a system of ve
unknowns I , L, D, L and  as follows:26666666664
2I +
h
1+h+z
D +
N2h
1+h
 = 1

2L +
z
1+h+z
D + L = 0
2D + I +
N2h
1+h
 = 1

L + 2L = 0
I + L +
h+z
1+h+z
D + L +
h
2 + (N2 1)h
1+h
i
 = 1

37777777775
. (11)
Combining (11) with  = Cov(~";~!)
V ar(~!)
gives a system of six equations and six unknowns (, I ,
L, D, L and ). Solving this system yields the following proposition.
Proposition 1 The equilibrium price function is
~p = ~!,
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and the trading strategies of the insider, designated trader, and the other informed are,
~xI = I~"+ L~yL,
~xD =
hD
1 + h+ z
~yD +

zD
1 + h+ z
+ L

~yL,
~xj =
h
1 + h
~yj,
where j = 1; 2; : : : ; N2, and where
 =
p
C2
uC1
; I =
3 (h+ 2) (h+ 2z + 2)
C1
; L =  2z (h+ 2)
C1
D =
3 (h+ 2) (h+ z + 1)
C1
; L =
z (h+ 2)
C1
;  =
(h+ 1) (3h+ 4z + 6)
C1
;
with
C1 = N2h (3h+ 4z + 6) + 3 (h+ 2) (3h+ 4z + 4) ;
C2 = N2h (h+ 1) (3h+ 4z + 6)
2 + (h+ 2)2

2 (3h+ 4z)2 + 45h+ 68z + 36

:
Proof. See Appendix A1.
Four notable observations emerge from Proposition 1. First, we note that the insiders
trading strategy depends explicitly on the leaked information ~yL = ~"+~ (i.e., L 6= 0) despite
the fact that the insider observes ~", and ~yL is simply a garbled version of ~". This means
that price is sensitive to the ~yL-based trades of both the insider and trader D whose joint
~yL-based order ow equals L +

zD
1+h+z
+ L

= 2z(h+2)
C1
.
Second, we note that the insiders ~yL-based trading strategy (i.e., L) is negative while
trader Ds ~yL-based trading strategy,

zD
1+h+z
+ L

, is positive which means that the insider
trades in the opposite direction to trader D with respect to the leaked information. This
reects the insiders desire to dampen the market order ow by (partially) o¤setting orders
submitted by trader D that are sensitive to ~yL in order to secure favorable price terms from
the market maker.
Third, we note that when z = 0, ~xD = ~xj; otherwise, when z > 0, trader D trades more
than the other N2 informed traders in the sense that V ar (~xD) > V ar (~xj), which can be
shown by direct computation (see also Lemma 1 below).
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Finally, we note that for a given , increasing z decreases , which means that information
leakage causes the other informed traders to trade less aggressively on their own information.
As we illustrate in the next section, this is an important consequence of information leakage
and will prove central to our results.
3 Rational Information Leakage
In this section, we address the insiders rationale for leaking information. We begin by rst
characterizing the ex ante prots of the designated trader and other N2 informed traders.
Substituting the trading strategies ~xD and ~xj described in Proposition 1 into the traders
respective prot expressions in (9), we have:
D (z; h;N2) =
u (h+ 2)
2  9h+ 16z + (3h+ 4z)2
C1
p
C2
(12)
j (z; h;N2) =
uh (h+ 1) (3h+ 4z + 6)
2
C1
p
C2
(13)
and D +N2j = j

N2 + 1 +
8z [(5h+ 4)(h+ 2) + 2z(3h+ 4)]
h (h+ 1) (3h+ 4z + 6)2

(14)
where j = 1; 2; : : : ; N2 and C1 and C2 are dened in Proposition 1.
Expressions (12) through (14) suggest that D  j. This follows because the leaked
signal, ~yL, provides the designated trader additional information concerning the assets payo¤
unavailable to the other N2 traders. Indeed, we can show that as ~yL becomes increasingly
more precise (i.e., as z increases), the designated traders prot increases while the prot
of the other N2 traders decreases. As a result, if N2 is large, information leakage decreases
the prot of designated trader and the other N2 informed traders combined. We summarize
these observations in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 The expected prot of the designated trader is increasing in the precision of the
leaked information. The expected prots of the other N2 informed traders are decreasing in
the precision of leaked information. Finally, for large N2, we have
@(D+N2j)
@z
 0.
Proof. Direct computation.
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To analyze the insiders motivation for leaking information we begin by recasting the in-
siders demand, ~xI = I~"+L~yL in Proposition 1, as a trading strategy based on two distinct
pieces of information; information about the assets fundamental value ~" and information
about the non-fundamental component ~ of the leaked signal ~yL = ~"+ ~. That is,
~xI = (I + L) ~"+ L~. (15)
Intuitively, we expect information leakage to dampen the insiders demand corresponding
to the fundamental component because sharing information with other traders (here the
designated trader D) weakens the insiders information advantage about ~". At the same
time, expression (15) suggests that information leakage generates a trading opportunity
for the insider, one that is based on information about the non-fundamental component ~.
The intuition is straightforward. Because price is sensitive to ~yL-based trades, the insiders
knowledge of both ~" and ~yL (and by default ~) generates an informational advantage about
the assets execution price, ~p.
Substituting (15) into the insiders ex ante prot expression in (9) yields
I (z; h;N2) =
u (h+ 2)
2 (3h+ 4z + 6)2
C1
p
C2
+
4zu (h+ 2)
2
C1
p
C2
; (16)
where the two terms in (16) correspond to the ~"-sensitive and ~-sensitive trades in (15)
respectively, and C1, C2 are as dened earlier. Intuitively then, we expect information leakage
to lower the insiders prot corresponding to the fundamental component but increase the
insiders prot corresponding to the non-fundamental component (because leakage is the
mechanism that generates ~-sensitive trades in the rst place).7 Therefore, the insiders
decision whether to leak information and how much information to leak depends on the
relative importance of these two e¤ects.
Expression (15) illustrates how information leakage gives the insider an informational
advantage about the assets execution price. At the same time, Lemma 1 shows that such
7Leaking generates an informational advantage about the assets execution price as long as the insider
does not reveal his private information, ~", perfectly. With perfect leakage (i.e., z !1) the designated trader
is as equally well informed as the insider and hence price is no longer sensitive to ~. This implies that perfect
leakage is never optimal for the insider.
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leakage benets the designated trader and harms the other N2 traders. Therefore, taken
together, these results imply that if the insider were to prot from his information advantage
about the assets execution price, the prots would accrue at the expense of the other N2
traders. To illustrate this somewhat di¤erently, we recast the insiders prot in (16) as a
fraction (or percentage) of total market prot as follows:
I (z; h;N2) =
V ar (~xI)
V ar (~xI) + V ar (~xD) +N2V ar (~xj)
 2u
=
1
1 +
[V ar(~xD)+N2V ar(~xj)]
V ar(~xI)
 2u; (17)
where 2u represents the expected costs borne by liquidity traders (or equivalently the
combined trading prots of informed traders), and [V ar(~xD)+N2V ar(~xj)]
V ar(~xI)
represents the trading
aggressiveness of the insider (or his market share) relative to the N2 + 1 informed traders.
In contrast to expression (16) which characterizes the insiders prot in relation to the two
sources of insider information, expression (17) suggests that the prot impact of information
leakage can also be understood in terms of its consequences to the other market participants,
namely the liquidity traders and N2 + 1 informed traders.
Consider rst the e¤ect of leakage on  holding the e¤ects on the other N2 + 1 traders
constant. As we will show in Proposition 3 below, an increase in z typically improves market
liquidity (i.e.,  1) which reduces the losses incurred by liquidity traders. From (17), it
follows that a lower  reduces the prots to be shared by all informed traders including
the insider. This implies that the insiders prot from information leakage must be at the
expense of the other N2 + 1 traders.
Next, consider the e¤ect of leakage on the designated trader through the term V ar(~xD)
V ar(~xI)
.
From Lemma 1, this term can be computed as V ar(~xD)
V ar(~xI)
=
h
1 + 9(3h+4z+4)
(3h+4z)2+9h+16z
i 1
, which is
unambiguously increasing in z. Hence, ceteris paribus, information leakage decreases the
insiders prot in (17) via V ar(~xD)
V ar(~xI)
.
Lastly, we consider the e¤ect of leakage on V ar(~xj)
V ar(~xI)
=
h
(h+2)2
h(h+1)
+ (h+2)
2
h(h+1)
4z
(3h+4z+6)2
i 1
which
remains the only potential avenue for the insider to benet from information leakage. The
rst component in V ar(~xj)
V ar(~xI)
represented by the term (h+2)
2
h(h+1)
corresponds to the trading ag-
12
gressiveness of the insider relative the other N2 informed traders with respect to the assets
fundamental value ~" (i.e., corresponds to the rst term in expression (15)). This term is
una¤ected by z because information leakage does not alter the insiders relative information
advantage vis-a-vis the other N2 informed traders with respect to the assets fundamental
value ~". In contrast, the second component in V ar(~xj)
V ar(~xI)
represented by the term (h+2)
2
h(h+1)
4z
(3h+4z+6)2
,
which corresponds to the insiders aggressiveness with respect to non-fundamental informa-
tion ~, is increasing in z for small z (when z < 3h+6
4
). This implies that V ar(~xj)
V ar(~xI)
is decreasing
in z (for small z) and hence information leakage increases the insiders prot via V ar(~xj)
V ar(~xI)
.
Finally, we note that the impact of leakage on other informed traders is particularly robust
for large N2.
Taken together, the preceding discussion suggests that the insiders benet from infor-
mation leakage (if any) comes at the expense of the other informed traders. Formally, then,
if z = max f0; arg maxz I (z; h;N2)g represents the insiders optimal choice of z, we say
that information leakage is rational if arg maxz I (z; h;N2) > 0. We have:
Proposition 2 [Rational Information Leakage] Information Leakage to a single desig-
nated trader is rational if and only if
N2 > N^2 (h)  (13h
2 + 44h+ 28) + (h+ 2)
p
529h2 + 1004h+ 484
4h (h+ 1)
;
that is, z > 0 if and only if N2, the number of other informed traders, is su¢ ciently large.
Proof. See Appendix A2.
If N2 is greater than N^2, the optimal z can be solved for explicitly as the solution to
a cubic polynomial described in Appendix A2. The intuition is better captured in Figure
1 which plots the function N^2 (h) with a solid curve in the plane of (h;N2). We label the
solid curve separating the leakage versus non-leakage regions as the information leakage
frontier.Information leakage occurs in this region above the frontier (with +marks), i.e.,
when N2 is greater than N^2 (h).
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
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Proposition 2 (and Figure 1) suggest that information leakage is more likely when (i)
there are more informed traders in the market (N2 is large) and/or (ii) other informed
tradersare relatively well informed about the underlying asset (h is large). The intuition
is as follows: The insiders benet of leaking information comes from the reduced trading
of the other informed traders; if there are many such traders (N2 is large) and/or if these
traders are more aggressive due to their more precise signals (h is large), the benet of
leaking information is large and it is potentially rational for the insider to leak some of his
information.
Taken together, Lemma 1 and Proposition 2 suggest that rational information leakage
benets the insider (and the designated trader) at the expense of other informed traders. Of
course, this a¤ects the overall liquidity of the market because, as we noted earlier, the aggre-
gate expected prot of all informed traders, I + D +N2j, equals the expected cost borne
by liquidity traders, namely 2u. Indeed, for N2 large enough, and in particular greater than
N^2 (h), we conjecture that markets are more liquid and there is less information asymmetry
in the market (i.e.,  is lower) because the N2 informed traders trade less aggressively on
their private information when there is information leakage. In turn, a lower  implies that
information leakage dissipates the aggregate prot of the other informed traders and the
designated trader combined, i.e., D +N2j is lower with information leakage that without.8
We have:
Proposition 3 Rational information leakage to a designated trader (i) benets liquidity
traders (i.e., renders markets more liquid) and (ii) reduces the aggregate prots of informed
traders who are not insiders. That is, if z > 0, then  (z; h;N2)jz=z <  (z; h;N2)jz=0 and
(D +N2j)jz=z < (D +N2j)jz=0.
Proof. See Appendix A3.1.
An important implication of Proposition 3 is that information leakage benets uninformed
market participants (e.g., liquidity traders) but harms informed investors who are otherwise
not privy to inside information. A practical consequence is that informed investors have less
8This result prevails even if the insider leaks information to all informed traders, not just to one designated
trader (see Section 4.1). In this case, all traders will optimally trade on the information even though they
would be better o¤ if they were to jointly commit not to trade on the leaked information.
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of an incentive to collect and process information which may have important implications
for the e¢ cient functioning of capital markets.
Rational information leakage also has implications for assessing the informational e¢ -
ciency of market price. For instance, with leakage we expect the price of the risky asset to
be more e¢ cient because more of the insiders information is eventually impounded in price.
In the context of our model, if we dene price informativeness as 1
V ar(~"j~p) , the precision of
the risky asset payo¤ conditional on its price, then we expect 1
V ar(~"j~p) evaluated at all values
of z > 0 to be greater than 1
V ar(~"j~p) evaluated at z = 0. We have:
Proposition 4 Markets are more informationally e¢ cient with rational information leakage
than without. That is,
@ 1
V ar(~"j~p)
@z
> 0.
Proof. See Appendix A3.2.
4 Model Extensions
In this section, we discuss potential extensions of our model and illustrate the robustness of
our results to some alternative modeling assumptions.
4.1 Leaking Information to All Informed Traders
In this subsection, we consider the possibility that the insider leaks information to all other
informed traders in the marketplace rather than a single trader labeled earlier as the desig-
nated trader. To address this question, we adapt the general model introduced in Section
2.1 and solved for in Appendix A1 by setting N2 = 0 so that all remaining (N1 > 1) in-
formed traders are privy to the leaked information.9 Given this structure, we dene rational
information leakage as before; namely, we say that information leakage is rational if z, the
precision of all leaked signals, is greater than zero. We have:
Proposition 5 Information leakage to all informed traders is rational if and only if
N1 > N^1 (h)  (h+ 2) (17h+ 14) + (h+ 2)
p
529h2 + 1004h+ 484
4h (h+ 1)
;
9In contrast, recall that in Sections 2 and 3 we have N1 = 1 and N2 > 0.
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that is, z > 0 if and only if N1, the number of informed traders who receive leaked informa-
tion from the insider is su¢ ciently large.
Proof. See Appendix A4.1.
We note that the necessary and su¢ cient condition for information leakage in Proposition
5, i.e., N^1 (h), mirrors the corresponding condition in Proposition 2 (i.e., N^2 (h)) where
the insider leaks information to a single designated trader. In particular, we note that
N^1 (h) = N^2 (h) + 1 because in the model considered in Section 3 we have N2 + 1 informed
traders (other than the insider) while in the current model we haveN1 informed traders. More
importantly, the correspondence between Propositions 2 and 5 implies that the rationale for
information leakage depends on the size of the informed trader population rather than on
the presence of a single designated trader or a subset of the population that may receive
leaked information.
To elaborate on the importance of the size of the informed trader population, we note
that when all traders are privy to leaked information, the protability of their trades reect
two countervailing forces. While an individual trader benets from the leaked information
much like he would if he were the sole designated trader in Section 3, he is also harmed by
the presence of other traders also privy to leaked information, much like the other informed
traders in Section 3. When N1 > N^1, the second e¤ect dominates so that all informed
traders are worse o¤ despite the fact that the information that is revealed improves their
understanding of rm value.10
The preceding discussion suggests that if the insider rationally leaks information to all
other informed traders, his benet accrues at the expense of those same traders. Moreover,
we nd that when the insider optimally leaks information to all other informed traders,
markets are more liquid and there is less information asymmetry (i.e.,  is lower). Taken
together, these ndings mirror our earlier results in Proposition 3 where information leakage
was limited to a single designated trader. We have:
10The N1 traders can benet in the aggregate if they all commit to refrain for using the leaked information
in their trading decisions. However, such a commitment is not credible for an individual trader who, ceteris
paribus, stands to benet from leaked information. In equilibrium, all traders will trade on the leaked
information to their aggregate detriment.
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Proposition 6 Rational information leakage to all informed traders (i) benets liquidity
traders (i.e., renders markets more liquid) and (ii) reduces the aggregate prots of informed
traders who are not insiders. That is, if z > 0, then I (z; h;N1)jz=z > I (z; h;N1)jz=0
and N1jjz=z < N1jjz=0.
Proof. See Appendix A4.2.
4.2 Insiders Choice of Designated Traders
Our model in Section 3 characterized the insiders strategy as a decision about how much
information to leak to a single designated trader (or to all traders as in Section 4.1) who
is, a priori, equally informed as the other informed traders in the marketplace. In this
subsection, we consider the possibility that an insiders strategy is to decide not only how
much information to leak but also to whomto leak the information (i.e., the choice of
designated traders).
To address this question we revisit the general formulation of our model described in
Section 2.1 (and illustrated in Appendix A1) where N1, respectively N2 traders observe
private signals about ~" with precisions h1 and h2 respectively. Assuming that h1 6= h2,
the insiders decision as to whom to leak to rests on whether the insider benets more
from leaking information to group 1 than from leaking information to group 2. That is, if
informed traders are di¤erentially informed prior to gaining access to leaked information,
will the insider exhibit a preference as to whom (or to which group) to leak the information?
Following our discussion in Section 3, we expect the insider to benet more from leaking
information to less well informed traders than leaking to better informed ones. The intuition
is straightforward. Recall that information leakage confers an information advantage about
execution price to the insider because trades based on leaked information renders price
sensitive to the noise components of the leaked signals. Less well informed traders rely more
on leaked information than their own private signals in formulating their strategies. This
implies that if the insider leaks information to the less well informed, then price is more
sensitive to the noise in leaked information. Consequently the insider gains more of an
information advantage about the assets execution price.
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Formalizing this intuition calls for a comparison of the insiders prot evaluated at z1
(the optimal leakage precision in the event that information is leaked to group 1) with the
insiders prot evaluated at z2 (the optimal leakage precision in the event that information
is leaked to group 2). Unfortunately, absent closed-form expressions for z1 and z

2 , the
complexity of the prot expressions precludes a general comparison. However, in the event
that the insiders choice is limited to selecting a single designated trader from either group
1 or group 2, we can formally derive the following proposition:
Proposition 7 Assume h1 > h2 and N1 +N2 is su¢ ciently large. If the insiders choice is
to select a single designated trader from either group 1 or group 2, then the insider prefers a
designated trader from the less well informed group (group 2).
Proof. See Appendix A4.3.
Beyond Proposition 7, numerical simulations suggest that the insiders preference to leak
information to the less well informed holds more generally. For example, if the insiders choice
is to select either group 1 or group 2 and leak information to all members in that group,
then the insider prefers the less well informed group (group 2). Figure 2 illustrates a typical
example with the following parameters: u = 1000, h1 = 2, h2 = 0:5 and N1 = N2 = 20.
For this example, we nd that when the insider leaks information to the better informed
group, his maximum prot (at z = 0:37) is 19:35 while if he leaks information to the less
well informed group, his maximum prot (at z = 0:27) is 19:92. Hence, the insider prefers
to leak information to the less well informed group.
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]
4.3 Other Extensions and Variation
4.3.1 Endogenous Number of Other Informed Traders
Our results in Section 3 were based on the assumption that there are a xed number (i.e.,
N2 + 1) of other informed traders. To assess how information leakage might a¤ect N2 if N2
were endogenous, we assume that the other informed traders enter the market by acquiring
18
the signal ~yj at a xed cost C > 0. Hence, the endogenous number N2 of other informed
traders is determined by j (z; h;N2 ) = C. With endogenous entry, we nd that information
leakage drives out some informed traders from the market because leakage reduces j (Lemma
1). Hence, N2 decreases.
With N2 determined endogenously, we nd that the insider is more likely to leak in-
formation than if the same N2 was exogenously specied. Formally, if the total derivative
dI(z;h;N2 )
dz
=
@I(z;h;N2 )
@z
+
@I(z;h;N2 )
@N2
dN2
dz
measures the insiders incentive to leak information
taking into account the e¤ect of z on N2, then we can show that
dI(z;h;N2 )
dz
>
@I(z;h;N2 )
@z
.
This follows because more informed traders reduce the insiders prot (
@I(z;h;N2 )
@N2
< 0) and
information leakage crowds out some informed traders (dN

2
dz
< 0). Hence, the optimal in-
formation leakage z with endogenous entry exceeds the optimal z characterized earlier in
Proposition 2.
4.3.2 Sale of Information to the Designated Trader
Our results thus far assumed that the insider voluntarily leaks private information to one
or more other traders without any fee or direct compensation in return. In light of prior
literature that examines the direct sale of information in nancial markets (discussed earlier
in the introduction), we also consider the possibility that an insider has the option to sell
his private information for a fee, perhaps as an alternative to (or in addition to) leaking
information for free.
With the ability to sell information as well as trade, the objective of the insider now is to
maximize (I + D   j), where D   j represents the price charged by the insider set in
a manner that exploits all the informational rents. Alternatively, we can think of the term
(I + D) as the joint (or collusive) prots of the insider and the designated trader and j as
the designated traders reservation prot if he were to abstain from purchasing information
from the insider. Given this objective, if we let zsale represent the optimal amount of informa-
tion sold by the insider, i.e., zsale = max f0; arg maxz [I (z; h;N2) + D (z; h;N2)  j (z; h;N2)]g,
then it follows easily that zsale  z, which means that the insiders motivation to share his
information is further enhanced if he were also compensated for it.11
11To see this, note that @(I(z;h;N2)+D(z;h;N2) j(z;h;N2))@z  @I(z;h;N2)@z for all z because @D(z;h;N2)@z 
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In the absence of any regulatory restrictions, the sale of private information for a fee
is no doubt tempting. However, we suggest that, as a practical matter, a direct sale of
private information may be a less protable venture than leakage of private information,
and particularly more so if we interpret our insider as a corporate executive or a hedge
fund manager. Indeed, we conjecture that the probability of prosecution and its attendant
consequence is likely to be higher if an insider were to directly sell his information for a fee
as opposed to leaking it freely to an independent designated trader. As preliminary evidence
of our conjecture, we note that the recent insider trading cases cited by the SEC on their
website almost always involve the receipt or payment of direct fees and benets by various
parties.
5 Summary and Discussion
In this paper we examine an informed investors (e.g., an insiders) incentives to voluntarily
leak information about an assets value to an unrelated third party to whom we refer to as
a designated trader. Using a stylized Kyle model, we show that, while leaking information
dissipates the investors information advantage about the assets value, it enhances his infor-
mation advantage about the assets execution price relative to other informed traders in the
marketplace. These two e¤ects are countervailing. When the prot impact from enhanced
information about the execution price dominates, the insider has incentives to leak some of
his private information.
Although admittedly stylized, our model highlights a number of issues and implications
for capital markets, particularly those that pertain to insider trading regulations designed to
enhance public condence in capital markets. The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and
the subsequent amendments state that it is illegal to use or pass on to others material, non-
public information or enter into transactions while in possession of such information. The
regulations give the enforcement power to the SEC which can bring civil charges against any
violators and refer cases to the Justice Department for criminal prosecution.
0 and @j(z;h;N2)@z  0 by Proposition 1. Hence, zsale  z = max f0; arg maxz I (z; h;N2)g where the
inequality is strict if z > 0.
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In the context of our model, if we interpret the informed investor as a corporate executive,
o¢ cer, or director, then rational information leakage in our model can be characterized
potentially as illegal insider trading behavior by the SEC. On the other hand, if we interpret
the informed investor in our model as a brokerage rm whose analysts share with their clients
some of the information they collect and process, then the impropriety of information leakage
is less apparent. The impropriety is even less apparent if the information is shared without
any direct compensation in return. In these latter types of settings, the SEC usually evaluates
potential insider trading violations on a case by case basis because the SEC regulations do not
explicitly address such information sharing practices by security analysts. In a similar vein,
although the nancial industrys professional code of conduct explicitly prohibits trading by
a brokerage rm before the public release of its own analystsreports, it does not preclude
the brokerage rms clients from trading before the reports become public.12
Notwithstanding the legalities of insider trading and the SECs enforcement e¤orts, there
is a plethora of evidence to suggest that selective disclosures, information leakage and insider
trading are prevalent. For example, Seyhun (1992) shows that both the protability and the
volume of insider trading increased signicantly (by a factor of 4 to 6) during the 1980s
despite increased SEC enforcement e¤orts. Similarly, Irvine et al. (2007) provide evidence
that institutional traders are unusually active ahead of analyst buy recommendations, and
Christophe et al. (2010) nd that short sellers tend to short more shares ahead of analyst
sell recommendations. While our model doesnt exactly capture the institutional settings
underlying some of these studies, their ndings are consistent with the perception that
di¢ culties in investigating and proving insider trading cases renders the likelihood of being
caught and prosecuted for leaking or sharing information very low (see also SECs insider
trading website). The chance of detection and prosecution by the SEC is likely even lower if
the insider leaks information to an unrelated individual (or a small number of traders) who
can disavow a duty of trust. Finally, in the event of prosecution, an independent beneciary
of leaked information can mount an a¢ rmative defense that the leaked information was not
a factor in his decision to trade and that his trades are based on other private sources of
12For instance, see National Association of Securities Dealers (formerly NASD now FINRA) professional
code of conduct Rule 2110 Standards of Commercial Honor and Principles of Trades.
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information.
Our model also identies settings where information leakage is likely to be observed as
well as settings where current SEC regulations are most likely to be e¤ective. For example,
our model shows that the insider is more likely to leak information when more informed
traders actively trade in the security, and when these traders are better informed about
the underlying asset value. Hence, assuming that private information is most salient for
rms with high cash ow volatility (e.g., growth rms), our results suggest that the leakage
problem is likely most evident in the trading of growth or high cash volatility rms. Similarly,
our analysis suggests that Reg FD (issued by the SEC in 2000 mandating that all publicly
traded companies disclose material information to all investors at the same time) is most
e¤ective in reducing insider trading for those rms above the information leakage frontier
described by our model.
Appendix. Proofs
A1. Proof of Proposition 1
Standard computations show that in the general setup laid out at the beginning of Section
2, there exists an equilibrium in which the equilibrium price function is
~p = ~!;
and the trading strategies are:
~xI = I~"+ L
XN1
j=1
~yL;j;
~x1;j = DE (~"j~y1;j; ~yL;j) + L~yL;j; for j = 1; :::; N1;
~x2;j = E (~"j~y2;j) ; for j = 1; :::; N2,
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where
 =
p
C2
uC1
; I =
(h2 + 2) (3h1 + 2 (N1 + 2) z + 6)
C1
; L =  2 (h2 + 2) z
C1
;
D =
3 (h2 + 2) (h1 + z + 1)
C1
; L =
(h2 + 2) z
C1
;  =
(h2 + 1) (3h1 + 4z + 6)
C1
;
with
C1 = N2h2 (3h1 + 4z + 6) +N1 (h2 + 2) (3h1 + 4z) + 2 (h2 + 2) (3h1 + 4z + 6) ;
C2 = N2h2 (h2 + 1) (3h1 + 4z + 6)
2 +N1 (h2 + 2)
2 9h1 + 20z + (3h1 + 4z)2
+ (h2 + 2)
2 (3h1 + 4z + 6)
2 :
Hence, from expression (9) in Section 2.2, the respective prots of the insider, of a trader j
in group 1 who receive leaked information, and of a trader j in group 2 who do not, are:
I (z; h1; h2; N1; N2) =
u (h2 + 2)
2 (3h1 + 4z + 6)2 + 4N1z
C1
p
C2
;
1;j (z; h1; h2; N1; N2) =
u (h2 + 2)
2 16z + 9h1 + (3h1 + 4z)2
C1
p
C2
; for j = 1; :::; N1;
2;j (z; h1; h2; N1; N2) =
uh2 (h2 + 1) (3h1 + 4z + 6)
2
C1
p
C2
; for j = 1; :::; N2:
Proposition 1 follows by substituting N1 = 1 and h1 = h2 = h.
A2. Proof of Proposition 2
For I given by (16), direct computation shows:
@ log (I)
@z
=
f (z; h;N2)
Const+1
;
where Const+1 is a positive function of (z; h;N2), and
f (z; h;N2) = A3z
3 + A2z
2 + A1z + A0;
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with
A3 =  
64

N2h (2N2h
2 + 2N2h+ 29h
2 + 98h+ 80) + 57 (h+ 2)3

27 (h+ 2)3
;
A2 =  
16

N2h (6N2h
2 + 6N2h+ 213h
2 + 683h+ 514) + 3 (159h+ 233) (h+ 2)2

27 (h+ 2)2
;
A1 =
4 [6N22h
2 (h+ 1) N2h (165h2 + 517h+ 362)  (h+ 2) (441h2 + 1293h+ 952)]
9 (h+ 2)
;
A0 = 2h
2 (h+ 1)N22   h
 
44h+ 13h2 + 28

N2  
 
45h3 + 202h2 + 292h+ 144

:
To solve for f (z; h;N2) = 0, we consider two cases:
Case 1: A0  0
If A0  0, then we easily show that A1 < 0. This means that all four coe¢ cients of the
cubic polynomial f (z; h;N2) are negative which in turn implies that the cubic polynomial
has no positive real roots (by Descartes rule of signs). So, f (z; h;N2) < 0 for all z > 0,
which means that prot I (; h;N2) achieves its maximum at z = 0.
Case 2: A0 > 0
If A0 > 0, then the coe¢ cients of the cubic polynomial f (z; h;N2) have one sign change
regardless of the sign of A1. Hence, by Descartes rule of signs, the cubic polynomial
f (z; h;N2) has one (unique) positive real root. That is, prot I (; h;N2) is unimodal in
z, rst increasing and then decreasing in z. Therefore, A0 > 0 is a necessary and su¢ cient
condition for rational information leakage, i.e., z > 0.
To show the conditions under which A0 > 0, we note that A0 is a quadratic polynomial
in N2 with a positive root given by
N^2 =
(13h2 + 44h+ 28) + (h+ 2)
p
529h2 + 1004h+ 484
4h (h+ 1)
:
Hence, N2 > N^2 is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for rational information leakage. And
the optimal z solves the cubic polynomial f(z; h;N2).
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A3. Proof of Propositions 3 and 4
A3.1. Proof of Proposition 3
It su¢ ces to prove part (i) (i.e., that rational information leakage implies that liquidity
traders benet) because part (ii) follows from part (i). To see this, note that if z > z, we
must have I (z; h;N2)jz=z > I (z; h;N2)jz=0, since the insider is choosing z to maximize
I (z; h;N2). If we can show  (z; h;N2)jz=z <  (z; h;N2)jz=0 in part (i), then it must also
be the case that (D +N2j)jz=z < (D +N2j)jz=0 because 2u = I + D + N2j. To
prove that is lower with information leakage than without, we use the expression for  in
Proposition 1 to show:

 (z; h;N2)
 (0; h;N2)
2
  1
=
 4z  g (z; h;N2)
(N2h2 + 2h2 +N2h+ 5h+ 4) (30h+ 24z + 3N2h2 + 6N2h+ 12hz + 9h2 + 4N2hz + 24)
2 ;
where
g (z; h;N2)
= 4

4 (N2   2)h2 + (2N2   3)h3 +
 
N22h
3 + 4N2h+ 4h+ 16

z
+ (h+ 2)2 (N2h  9h+ 4) (3h+N2h+ 4) :
So,  (z; h;N2)jz=z <  (z; h;N2)jz=0 if and only if g (z; h;N2) > 0 (when z > 0).
Note that when z > 0, we have N2 > N^2 =
(13h2+44h+28)+(h+2)
p
529h2+1004h+484
4h(h+1)
, which
implies that (N2h  9h+ 4) > 0, because
N2 > N^2 >
13h (h+ 1) +
p
529h (h+ 1)
4h (h+ 1)
= 9 > 9  4h 1 ) N2h  9h+ 4 > 0:
Also, N2 > 9 ) [4 (N2   2)h2 + (2N2   3)h3 + (N22h3 + 4N2h+ 4h+ 16)] > 0, and as a
result, we have g (z; h;N2) > 0 (for z > 0).
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A3.2. Proof of Proposition 4
Applying Bayesrule delivers
V ar (~"j~p) = V ar (~"j~!) = 1  Cov (~"; ~!)
V ar (~!)
Cov (~"; ~!) = 1  Cov (~"; ~!) ;
where the last equality follows from  = Cov(~";~!)
V ar(~!)
. Thus, @[1=V ar(~"j~p)]
@z
> 0 if and only if
@[Cov(~";~!)]
@z
> 0.
Substituting the expressions for tradersoptimal trading strategies into the total order
ow ~!, we can show:
Cov (~"; ~!) =
N2h (3h+ 4z + 6) + 2 (h+ 2) (3h+ 4z + 3)
3 (h+ 2) (h+ z + 1)
D
=
N2h (3h+ 4z + 6) + 2 (h+ 2) (3h+ 4z + 3)
C1
:
Direct computation yields:
@ log (Cov (~"; ~!))
@z
=
24 (h+ 2)2
C1 (N2h (3h+ 4z + 6) + 2 (h+ 2) (3h+ 4z + 3))
> 0:
A4. Proofs of Propositions in Section 4
A4.1. Proof of Proposition 5
Setting N2 = 0 and h1 = h in the expression of I in Appendix A1, we obtain
I (z; h;N1) =
u

1 + 4N1z
(3h+4z+6)2


2 + N1(3h+4z)
3h+4z+6
q
1 +N1
9h+20z+(3h+4z)2
(3h+4z+6)2
:
Direct computation shows
@I (z; h;N1)
@z
/ A3z3 + A2z2 + A1z + A0;
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where
A3 =  64
 
2N21 + 25N1 + 30

;
A2 =  16
 
5N21 + 6N
2
1h+ 226N1 + 201N1h+ 270h+ 468

;
A1 = 12

h (6h+ 5)N21  
 
362h+ 177h2 + 160

N1   18 (h+ 2) (15h+ 22)

;
A0 = 27

2h2 (h+ 1)N21   h (h+ 2) (17h+ 14)N1   6 (5h+ 6) (h+ 2)2

:
Note that A0 is a quadratic function in N1, and it is positive if and only if
N1 > N^1 (h)  (h+ 2) (17h+ 14) + (h+ 2)
p
529h2 + 1004h+ 484
4h (h+ 1)
:
Similarly, A1 is also a quadratic function of N1, and it is positive if and only if
N1 > N1 (h) 
(362h+ 177h2 + 160) +
q
(362h+ 177h2 + 160)2 + 4h (6h+ 5) 18 (h+ 2) (15h+ 22)
2h (6h+ 5)
:
We can easily establish N^1 < N1. Specically, we multiply the numerator and the
denominator of N^1 by 3 and show that they are respectively smaller and greater than their
counterparts of N1. As a result, if A0 < 0, or if N1 < N^1, then we must have N1 < N1 and
hence A1 < 0. It follows that z > 0 because the cubic polynomial A3z3 + A2z2 + A1z + A0
above has one real root.
A4.2. Proof of Proposition 6
As was the case for the proof of Proposition 3, we only need to prove part (i). Setting N2 = 0
and h1 = h in the expression of  in Appendix A1, we obtain
 (z; h;N1) =
q
1 +N1
9h+20z+(3h+4z)2
(3h+4z+6)2
u
 
2 +N1
3h+4z
3h+4z+6
 :
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Direct computation delivers

 (z; h;N1)
 (z; h;N1)
2
  1
=  4N1z [4 (4N1 +N
2
1h  4h) z + (2h+N1h+ 4) (N1h+ 4  10h)]
(4h+N1h2 +N1h+ h2 + 4) (6h+ 8z + 3N1h+ 4N1z + 12)
2 :
As a result, it is su¢ cient to show 4 (4N1 +N21h  4h) z+(2h+N1h+ 4) (N1h+ 4  10h) >
0 (when z > 0) to establish Proposition 6.
When z > 0, by Proposition 5, we know
N1 >
(h+ 2) (17h+ 14) + (h+ 2)
p
529h
4h (h+ 1)
=
(h+ 2) (20h+ 7)
2h (h+ 1)
:
So, N1h >
(h+2)(20h+7)
2(h+1)
, and hence N1h + 4   10h > (h+2)(20h+7)2(h+1) + 4   10h = 12 35h+22h+1 > 0.
Also, by N1 >
(h+2)(20h+7)
2h(h+1)
> 10, we have (4N1 +N21h  4h) > (4N1 + 96h) > 0. Therefore,
we have 4 (4N1 +N21h  4h) z + (2h+N1h+ 4) (N1h+ 4  10h) > 0.
A4.3. Proof of Proposition 7
To prove the insiders choice of a designated trader, we recast our model slightly as follows.
Let the designated trader hail from informed trader group a 2 f1; 2g and label the other
informed group as group b. Then, following Appendix A1, the trading strategies will be:26666664
~xI = I~"+ L~yL
~xD = DE (~"j~yD; ~yL) + L~yL
~xa;j = aE (~"j~ya;j)
~xb;j = bE (~"j~yb;j)
37777775 ,
where the coe¢ cients are endogenously determined as before.
Following the earlier derivation of the insiders prot in Appendix A1, we have
I;a (z) =
Xa (z)
Ya (z)
p
Wa (z)
;
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where
Xa (z) = 1 +
4z
(4z + 3ha + 6)
2 ;
Ya (z) = 2 +
8z
(4z + 3ha + 6) (ha + 2)
+
Naha
ha + 2
+
Nbhb
hb + 2
;
Wa (z) = 1 +
4z
(4z + 3ha + 6)
2

5 +
(3ha + 4) (2ha + 4z) + 4ha
(ha + 2)
2

+
Naha (ha + 1)
(ha + 2)
2 +
Nbhb (hb + 1)
(hb + 2)
2 :
Now, let z1 and z

2 be the optimal information leakage when the designated trader hails
from group 1 (with private precision h1) and group 2 (with private precision h2) respectively.
If N1 + N2 is su¢ ciently large, then following Proposition 2 both z1 and z

2 are positive.
Now let I;1  I;1 (z1) and I;2  I;2 (z2) be the optimal prots. Our objective is to
show that I;1 < 

I;2 when h1 > h2. We note that 

I;2 > I;2 (z

1) by the denition of the
optimum. That is leaking z2 to a designated trader from group 2 dominates leaking any
other z (including the z1 that would have been optimal for group 1). Hence, if we can show
that I;2 (z1) > 

I;1, then we have a su¢ cient proof of 

I;2 > I;2 (z

1) > 

I;1.
We have:
I;2 (z

1)  I;1 (z1) =
X2 (z

1)
Y2 (z1)
p
W2 (z1)
  X1 (z

1)
Y1 (z1)
p
W1 (z1)
=
X1 (z

1)
Y2 (z1)
p
W2 (z1)
"
X2 (z

1)
X1 (z1)
  Y2 (z

1)
Y1 (z1)
s
W2 (z1)
W1 (z1)
#
and we can show the following:
X2 (z

1)
X1 (z1)
= 1 +
12z1 (h1   h2)
(4z1 + 3h2 + 6)

(4z1 + 3h1 + 6)
2 + 4z1
 2 + 3 (h1   h2)
(4z1 + 3h2 + 6)

;
Y2 (z

1)
Y1 (z1)
= 1 +
8z1 (h1 h2)
(4z1+3h2+6)(h1+2)(h2+2)

1 + 3(h2+2)
(4z1+3h1+6)

2 +
8z1
(4z1+3h1+6)(h1+2)
+ N1h1
h1+2
+ N2h2
h2+2
;
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and
W2 (z

1)
W1 (z1)
= 1 +
4z1 (h1   h2)K (z1 ; h1; h2)
1 +
4z1
(4z1+3h1+6)
2

5 +
(3h1+4)(2h1+4z1)+4h1
(h1+2)
2

+ N1h1(h1+1)
(h1+2)
2 +
N2h2(h2+1)
(h2+2)
2
;
where K (z1 ; h1; h2) is a positive number which depends on (z

1 ; h1; h2) but does not depend
on N1 or N2.
Note that
X2(z1)
X1(z1)
> 1 and is independent of N1 and N2. In contrast, both
Y2(z1)
Y1(z1)
and
W2(z1)
W1(z1)
are decreasing in N1 and/or N2. Moreover,
Y2(z1)
Y1(z1)
r
W2(z1)
W1(z1)
approaches 1 for large N1
and/or N2. Hence,
X2(z1)
X1(z1)
  Y2(z

1)
Y1(z1)
r
W2(z1)
W1(z1)
> 0 for su¢ ciently large N1+N2. This completes
the proof.
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Figure 1  The Region of Rational Information Leakage  
 
 
 
Notes. The symbol “+” indicates the region for which the number of other informed traders N2 
exceeds the threshold value 𝑁�2(ℎ), where h represents the precision of other informed trader’s 
private information.  The solid curve represents the “information leakage frontier”. 
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Figure 2  Insider’s Choice of Designated Traders 
 
 
Notes. This figure shows the insider’s profit as a function of the precision of the leaked 
information z in the presence of two groups of differentially informed traders.  We assume the 
insider can choose to leak information to the entire better-informed group (solid curve) or to the 
entire less-informed group (dashed curve). Both groups have 20 traders: 𝑁1 = 𝑁2 = 20. The 
traders in group 1 receive private signals with precision of ℎ1 = 2, while the traders in group 2 
receive private signals with precision of ℎ2 = 0.5. The variance of noise trading is 𝜎𝑢 = 1000. 
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